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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with techniques of measuring and assessment of 
the voice transmitted in IP networks in secure and insecure 
environment using different virtual testbeds and a real 
implementation based on OpenSer. We realized our real platform, 
in order to understand how the voice services in IP network are 
affected by using the secure IP environment. The real 
performance test was implemented between VSB-Technical 
University in Ostrava and University degli studi of Milan. 
 
We have described a secure solution based on Virtual Private 
Network and how this security can influence the DoS resistance. 
Our aim was to underline how the voice performances could be 
influenced by DoS attacks and, how much, the usage of a VPN 
can decrease the infrastructure resistance while is overloaded by 
DoS attacks. Following to this, we have pointed out the 
advantages and the disadvantages of the adopted security measure 
and we compare the performances of both solutions. Further we 
have described two virtual testbed, one developed using a traffic 
emulator and the second one based on a network simulator. Both 
the virtual environments were implemented in secure and insecure 
way. The performance evaluation of the VoIP applications is quite 
complex, for this reason we adopted an application Ixchariot, that 
is able to compute such complex evaluation indexes, such as  
MOS and R-Factor.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last five years, the growth of voice services over data 
networks, and especially over the Web, has reached considerable 
levels. The fast expansion of a  technology branch usually raises a 
number of security issues due to the fact that many of the 
components of such projects are not generally ready to reach high 
expansion levels. In this document, we have examined a real VoIP 
implementation based on Openser, a famous application used by a 
large number of Voice over IP providers. Our analysis has taken 
into account characteristic performance indicators of VoIP 
protocols, in order to evaluate quality of service decreasing due to 
DoS attacks. We analysed a secure solution based on Virtual 
Private Network, and the DoS resistance. Furthermore we 
described two virtual testbeds, one developed using IxChariot and 
the second based on Ns-2. Ixchariot is a software solution that 
simulates the VoIP traffic and parameters over a real network 
environment. Instead Ns-2 is a simulator that can design complex 
and large-scale network with custom parameters. Both the virtual 
environments were implemented in a secure and in an insecure 
way. The performance evaluation of the VoIP applications is 
described in [1] and [2], we adopted IxChariot  that can compute 
evaluation indexes, such as MOS and R-Factor. On this virtual 
environment we performed experiments aimed to compare the 
obtained results with indexes extracted from real tests. In the 
testbeds using Ns-2 the simulation  worked on a single PC and it 
reproduced our real environment configuration and the desired 
traffic conditions. It was necessary to use this simulator in order to 
generalize our results and compare them to large-scale simulations 
in the future. Virtual Private Network (VPN), assuring 
confidentiality and strong authentication (using appropriate keys 
exchange), is able to provide a consistent security defence 
solution against the first two threats. As well documented in [3]. 
The security assurance introduced by the VPN does not provide a 
solution for DoS technique based attacks. We had to consider that 
the VPN introduces more traffic on the network. For these reasons 
we wanted to observe if this security solution has some impact on 
DoS resistance. During our Ns-2 case simulations, we did not 
have a specific implementation for VoIP application layer. For 
this reasons during these tests we were able to simulate just 
generical DoS attacks using a traffic overload to represent the 
VPN presence. To keep correspondence with attack implemented 
in Ns-2, the attack simulated in Ixchariot and the real 
environments was realized by filling bandwidth with UDP 
packets. 
2. TEST ENVIRONMENT 
We realized our real platform, in order to understand how the 
security measures of VoIP such as VPN can reduce the DoS 
resistance and so bias the speech quality.  During the execution of 
such real-tests we used only a specific DoS attack, focalising our 
attention on the different performances. The first problem we 
encountered was about the performance indicator to use.  
R-value 
lower limit 
MOS Speech 
Transmission 
Quality Category 
User 
Satisfaction 
90 4,34 Best Very satisfied 
80 4,03 High Satisfied 
70 3,6 Medium Some users 
dissatisfied 
60 3,1 Low Many users 
dissatisfied 
50 2,58 Poor Nearly all users 
dissatisfied 
Table 1. The R-factor / MOS Comparison. 
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The most famous parameters are the MOS “Mean Opinion Score'' 
and the R-Factor. The first one is a 1 to 5 index, where 5 is the 
best quality speech. This parameter is subjective. On the contrary 
the R-Factor is a scalar based on the E-Model, a computational 
model for performance evaluation of data networks. The scale of 
the R-factor is up to 94 for narrowband and up to 120 for 
wideband codecs, a conversion between MOS and R-factor is 
possible. The extraction of these indexes is quite complex and we 
used a software suite called Ixchariot to make simulations on our 
platform and compute comparable results. Also, in order to 
generalize our results, we used Ns-2 with integrated framework 
for data Collection and Statistical Analysis for testing large 
bandwidth environment. 
2.1 Real Test 
The basic configuration of the real tests required 2 PCs provided 
by GNU/Linux Debian, one was based  at the University of Milan, 
Italy and the other PC at the VSB-Technical University of 
Ostrava, Czech Republic, the bandwith was limited to 10 Mbit/s 
by traffic shaping. OpenSer was installed in Ostrava. OpenSer is 
an open source SIP server/router. It can be used on systems with 
limited resources as well as on Service Provider servers. It is able 
to manage up to thousand calls per second. In addition to 
OpenSer, we needed another software to generate Sip/Rtp traffic. 
We decided to adopt Sipp, an Open Source test tool/traffic 
generator for the SIP protocol. It includes basic user agent 
scenarios (UAC and UAS) and establishes and releases multiple 
calls with the INVITE and BYE methods. It is possible to build 
custom XML files to describe from very simple to complex call 
flows. The results of a test are dynamically displayed during the 
execution (call rate, round trip delay, and message statistics). One 
of the more important feature is the possibility to send media 
(RTP) traffic through RTP echo and RTP/pcap replay. Media can 
be audio or audio+video. We used this option to generate real 
calls with G.729 and G.711Alaw audio codecs. The audio codecs 
used, G.729 and G.711Alaw, are two different formats of audio 
compression. The first one, is commonly used with VoIP devices, 
the standard configuration of G.729 operates at 8 kbit/s bitrate, a 
low bandwidth requirement. The G.711Alaw codec offer a higher 
level of quality  respect of the G.729, but takes more bandwidth. 
The level of bitrate of this codec is 64 kbit/s. This codec is a 
standard audio compression format defined by the ITU-T. The 
difference of voice quality evaluation between the codecs is stated 
as 10% [4]. The choice of two different codecs was made to 
underline that a low bandwidth requirement codec is of course 
offering less voice quality, but offers more DoS resistance. To 
obtain valid G.711Alaw and G.729 traffic, it was necessary to 
capture one of our test call with Wireshark. The captured traffic 
was used during the tests to generate the RTP traffic. The test 
configuration was deployed to realize 25, 50 and 100 concurrent 
calls with the duration of 30sec. Every concurrency step 
(25,50,100) was repeated one-hundred time for both codecs 
(G.711 and G.729). For every codec the test has done with or 
without VPN. We adopted OpenVpn, a simple security solution, 
for protecting the SIP signalling and the RTP data flow using the 
TLS protocol. Using both the secure or the insecure configuration, 
the testbed network has been overloaded with 4 Mbit/s of UDP 
traffic using Iperf. Iperf reports bandwidth, delay jitter, datagram 
loss. This software permits to generate a pre-defined amount of 
traffic for a pre-defined duration. This last feature was very 
important for us, in order to configure the tests over stress 
conditions. During the test we tried to attack the network in a 
specific way, mentioned in Section 3, to understand the level of 
resistance of the network itself. As said before, the OpenSer 
server was based in Ostrava and the Sipp client in Milan. On the 
machine in Ostrava we also configured another instance of Sipp, 
in order to answer to the calls addressed by OpenSer.  Both 
universities are connected to the national research and education 
networks which are linked by multi-gigabit pan-European 
communication network, called Geant2. It is a significant 
advantage to be part of high speed network because the end-to-
end delay between our endpoints has been approximately 30 ms. 
2.2 Testbed using IxChariot 
IxChariot is a software, produced by Ixia, useful to predict device 
and system performance under realistic network loading 
conditions. The security solution adopted was OpenVpn. The test 
environment was built with the IxChariot console and two 
IxChariot endpoints (Installable under several operating systems). 
The IxChariot console allows selecting several test configurations 
for IPv4 with and without QoS. At the end of the test, for each 
possible configuration, it is possible to obtain measurement of the 
throughput, jitter, MOS and R-Factor. The concurrent calls were 
repeated one-hundred times for both codecs (G.711 and G.729). 
We have noticed that the best way to execute a test is by the batch 
procedure, because in this way the final results was sent to the 
console only at the end of the test. In such way it was possible to 
avoid some influence, due to the result data, during the test [5]. 
2.3 Simulation with Ns-2 
It was necessary to use Ns-2 to generalize our real testbed 
environment. We replicated the Milan - Ostrava scenario  with the 
same end-to-end delay and with the same bandwidth capacity, in 
order to evaluate and to compare performance losses under DoS 
attack. Ns-2 is not provided with an appropriate tool for value 
measuring indexes such as Packet loss, throughput, IP delay 
variation, etc. For this reason we chose the Ns-2 Measure module, 
an integrated framework for data collection and statistical analysis 
within Ns-2. The Ns-2 testbed was deployed with the same traffic 
loading of the real testbed, using a CBR (Constant bit rate) 
application over UDP. In order to simulate the attacks and the 
security measures we simply increased the value of the CBR in 
such a way to overload the simulated network and observe the 
packet-loss and the throughput. Our aim was to obtain a valid Ns-
2 model to replicate the VoIP application behaviour, in order to 
study large-scale attacks and countermeasures in the future. The 
CBR model offers the advantage to insert in the simulated 
network the desired amount of traffic. Following this, it was 
possible to examine the Ns-2 test configuration. Our choice was to 
simulate the test configuration with 100 concurrent calls. During 
the secure tests the VPN was computed by incrementing the CBR 
value of the 3%. This value was decided analysing the data 
reported in [5], [6] where the results obtained showed that the 
VPN loading is contained between the 1% and 5% of the RTP 
traffic total amount. 
3. ADOPTED ATTACK TECHNIQUE  
In this section we explain in details the specific implementation of 
our attack in real tests, using IxChariot and Ns-2,  and give a 
summary of our results. 
3.1 Implementation of Udp flooding attack  
With the use of Iperf it was possible to generate TCP/UDP traffic 
and address it to any destination as “IP.ADDR:PORT''. Our attack 
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was developed to overload the network with 4 Mbit/s of traffic at 
each step of the tests both in real testbed as in IxChariot case. The 
tests with the G.711 codec were the most influenced by the 
flooding attack because the codec used had a high bandwidth 
loading.  In the worst case (100 concurrent calls + VPN + 4Mbit 
UDP flooding) this test was repeated 100 times and the average 
packet loss equalled 15%. In the same case (100 concurrent calls 
+ VPN + 4Mbit UDP flooding), but using the G.729 codec, we 
registered a 5% packet loss.  
3.2 Implementation of flooding attack in Ns-2 
To simulate the behaviour of our network using Ns-2 it was 
necessary to calculate the correct value of CBR. For a call with 
G.711 codec the bitrate on the application layer is 68.8 kbps with 
common payloads 160 Bytes. At this point we added the VPN 
overhead that we stated before as the 3% of the generated traffic.  
4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The deployed test in real case, using IxChariot and  Ns-2  were 
realized under  attack  condition  in order  to  evaluate  the  
performance  differences  between  an infrastructure with or 
without security measures. The adoption of a VPN and the 
repeated DoS attacks are of course increasing the packet loss 
during the transmission and for this reason PLC algorithms are 
used. The Packet loss concealment (PLC) is a technique used to 
reduce the effects of packet loss in Voip quality. The PLC 
technique is different upon the used codec. A simple method used 
by waveform codecs such as G.711, is to replay the last received 
sample with increasing attenuation for each replay. The packet 
loss can influence the  factor (Impairment Factor) which is 
part of the R-factor as you can see in the relation (1).  
    –  
              (1) 
The maximum value of  R-factor for narrowband codecs is 94, the 
overall quality (R-factor) is calculated by estimating the signal to 
noise ratio of a connection () and subtracting the network 
impairments (
,  ,   ) and by adding Advantage factor A. 
 is derived from original SNR (Signal to noise ratio),  it 
considers non-optimum sidetone,  quantizing distortion, overall 
loudness and other impairments which occur more or less 
simultaneously with the voice transmission. The delay 
impairments are included in the parameter  as a mathematical 
summary of transmission delay, talker echo and sidetone.    
is an equipment impairment that considers the influence of used 
codecs and impairments due to packet loss and rejection. In the 
case of G.711 without PLC or with PLC bursty packet loss it is 
possible to observe an issue. The impairment of speech quality 
appears in specified ranges of traffic between 80 and 90 
percentage points. In our case it is very important to notice that 
the observed value of packet loss changes significantly in the test 
with VPN, overload traffic and 100 VoIP pairs emulation, because 
the whole traffic approaches the limit of the available bandwidth. 
In this case  the speech quality depends especially on the packet 
loss. The particular values of  factor are stated in 
recommendation ITU-T G.113 and each codec is assigned a 
degradation value. If G.711 is used then   0 while in case of 
G.729 the value   10, but there are also known relations 
between the packet loss and   factor which are represented in 
figure 1. The plot of   values  vs.  packet loss  in  figure 1,  
shows the   factor increasing proportionally to packet loss. The 
curve for G.711 without PLC (Packet Loss Concealment) 
indicates a higher value of the  factor.  As the packet loss 
increases from 0 to 5%, the  value increases from 0 to 55 in case 
G.711 without PLC and from 0 to 15 in case G.711 with PLC. It 
shows the effectiveness of the PLC algorithms and how the usage 
of them can increase the R-factor and consequently the Voice 
Quality. The PLC algorithms are furtherly subdivided into random 
and bursty packet loss conditions and they are more efficient in 
the first case [7]. The third curve in figure 1 describes G.711 with 
PLC algorithm.   
 
Figure 1. Ie factor impairment due to packet loss 
Packet loss can be mitigated by PLC. From the point of view of 
the Voice quality, a packet loss rate of 2% or lower is not 
noticeable by the talkers. During our experiments we observed  a 
packet loss higher than 2% in the tests with security measures and 
traffic overloading. For this reason we investigated how the voice 
quality could be biased during DoS attacks and the usage of VPN. 
IP network packet loss distribution can be modelled using a 
Markov process. A multi-state Markov Model is used to measure 
the distribution of lost or discarded packets or frames, and to 
divide the call into “bursts” and “gaps”.  The call quality is 
calculated separately in each state and then combined using a 
perceptual model, such as in VQmon [8]. The mentioned VQmon 
does incorporate G.107 compliant implementation of the E-
Model. However, we applied a very simple method described in 
the last revision of G.107 from 2005 [1]. The impairment factor 
values for codec operation under packet-loss have formerly been 
treated using tabulated, packet-loss dependent -values (Figure 
4). In the last revision, the Packet-loss Robustness Factor   is 
defined as codec-specific value.   can be described as the 
robustness of the codec to packet-loss. Both values are listed in 
Appendix I of ITU-T G.113 and are available for several codecs. 
If we consider the Packet-loss Probability as , the  factor 
can be calculated using the formula: 
    95   ·


 !"#
$%
   (2) 
&'() is the so-called Burst Ratio, when packet loss is random 
&'() = 1  and when packet loss is bursty &'() > 1. For 
packet loss distributions corresponding to a 2-state Markov model 
with transition probabilities p between a "found" and a "loss" 
state, and q between the "loss" and the "found" state, the Burst 
Ratio can be calculated as: 
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In our case we assumed  a random packet loss distribution and we 
calculated  with the values obtained from the real Sipp tests. 
The achieved results are listed in table below. The results are valid 
for G.729 a G.711 codecs and the loss in an amount 5% and 15% 
in the worst-case (VPN+traffic 4Mbps).  
 
valid for 100 
concurrent 
calls 
only 
VoIP 
traffic 
w/o VPN 
with 
VPN 
with 
traffic 
4Mbps 
with 
VPN + 
4Mbps  
Ie-eff 
(G729+PLC) 10,4 10,5 10,7 27,7 
Ie-eff 
(G711+PLC) 0 2,2 30,7 35,5 
R-factor 
(G.729+PLC) 82,6 82,5 82,3 65,3 
R-factor 
(G711+PLC) 93 90,8 62,3 57,5 
Table 2. Calculated Ie-eff and R-factor. 
Once the   factor was calculated it was not difficult to 
determine R-factor as an output of E-Model (formula 1) using 
implicit values of recommendation ITU-T G.107 which are  
  94,7688 , 
  1,4136 ,   0 , hence we could modify 
formula 1,  
  93,3553        (4) 
The model used to estimate  is described in [7]. Where it is 
explained that the effects of delay are well known and easily 
modelled. Delays of less than 175ms have a small effect on 
conversational difficulty, then   4 · 2, where T is the delay in 
ms (In our case 30msec). The final achieved values of R-factor 
correspond to Ixchariot results with an aberration less than 5% 
and  are listed in Table 2. As we can observe from this table the 
R-factor obtained from our tests shows how the security measures 
adopted influence the Voice quality under DoS attacks.  
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
The real-time applications are very sensitive to packet loss, and 
each variation occurring on the network can modify and influence 
the final result of a real-time data transmission, such as a VoIP 
Call.  It is easy to understand that Denial of Service attacks are 
one of the major security problems in VoIP applications and one 
of the possible barrier that prevents many businesses from 
employing this technology.  Indeed, as we have seen during our 
real environment implementation, it is quite simple to apply 
eavesdrop defence techniques using cryptography but this 
countermeasure reduces the tolerance to the DoS attacks and the 
performances of VoIP services.  The growth up of the  botnet  
phenomenon - the ability of  infected computers networks, called 
zombies, to perform centralized DDos  (Distributed Denial of 
Service) attacks against determined targets - increases the danger 
of this threat. With our Ns-2 model, which is correlated to real 
environment and test environment, it is possible to obtain an 
approximate amount of the whole IP traffic including VoIP. This 
will help us to study the performance behaviour in large-scale 
attacks and the possible countermeasure effectiveness. It’s easy to 
understand that possible related works in this field could be 
connected with emerging threats of VoIP Botnets, studying 
possible countermeasures and analysing how they influence the 
performance indexes. The study presented in this paper is an 
extension of a previous work on the impact of security on the 
quality of VoIP calls [5], [6], [9] and provides a framework to 
analyse the quality of VoIP calls. The paper presents several new 
contributions. Firstly, it shows how to calculate R-factor from the 
packet loss, it brings a fast and easy method for the voice quality 
assessment (relations 2, 3 and 4). Secondly, it shows how VPN 
with TLS influences the voice quality. 
The executed measurements prove the obvious impact of some 
secure solutions on the voice quality. The impairment of speech 
quality appears in specified ranges of traffic comprised between 
80-90%. While using the G.711 codec in the insecure 
environment we observed the shift of R-factor from range “Best” 
quality to “Low” quality and  in the secure environment to “Poor” 
quality. We did not register the change of quality for G.729 calls 
in the insecure environment but we observed the shift of R-factor 
from range “High” quality to “Low” quality using the VPN 
environment. The threshold values of R-factor are defined in 
Table 1. We suppose it depends on the size of the block cipher 
encryption and next investigation could be a challenge for our 
future research.  
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